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Douglas: J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Rytex Corp.

J.P. STEVENS & CO. V. RYTEX CORP.
LABOR RELATIONs-Arbitration-disqualificationof arbitratorsarbitratorsbefore entering on their duties should make known
any relationshipwith any party and disclose all facts which might
indicate any interest or create presumption of bias. 34 N.Y.2d
123, 312 N.E.2d 466, 356 N.Y.S.2d 278 (1974).
J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Rytex Corp.1 provided the New York
1. 34 N.Y.2d 123, 312 N.E.2d 466, 356 N.Y.S.2d 278 (1974) (4-2 decision).
An interesting tangential issue is presented by the 4-2 division of the court. The
tabulation of the votes of the judges of the Court of Appeals indicates that the Honorable
Harold Stephens did not participate in deciding the case. The author presumes that the
reason was that he wrote the dissenting opinion at the appellate division level. J. P.
Stevens & Co. v. Rytex Corp., 41 App. Div. 2d 15, 18, 340 N.Y.S.2d 933, 936 (1st Dep't.
1973). Since this casenote deals with the subject of disqualification and the Court of
Appeals decision does in fact compare the role of an arbitrator with that of a judge, J. P.
Stevens & Co. v. Rytex Corp., 34 N.Y.2d 123, 129, 312 N.E.2d 466, 469, 356 N.Y.S.2d 278,
282-83 (1974), it is appropriate to ask whether or not a judge who decided a case in an
appellate court should disqualify himself from participating in the same case if he assumes
a position on a higher appellate court.
A memorandum of law was written by Mr. Justice Rehnquist on this subject. Laird
v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824 (1972). Justice Rehnquist stated:
Indeed, the clearest case of all is that of a Justice who comes to this court
from a lower court, and has, while sitting as a judge of the lower court, had
occasion to pass on an issue that later comes before this Court. No more compelling example could be found of a situation in which a Justice had previously
committed himself. Yet it is not and could not rationally be suggested that, so
long as the cases be different, a Justice of this Court should disqualify himself
for that reason. [citation omitted]. Indeed, there is weighty authority for this
proposition even when the cases are the same. Mr. Justice Holmes, after his
appointment to this Court, sat in several cases which reviewed decisions of the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts rendered, with his participation,
while he was Chief Justice of that Court.
Id. at 835-36. The cases involving Mr. Justice Holmes were all affirmed by the United
States Supreme Court without dissent. See Worchester v. Worchester Consol. St. Ry., 196
U.S. 539 (1905), reviewing 182 Mass. 49, 64 N.E. 581 (1902); Dunbar v. Dunbar, 190 U.S.
340 (1903), reviewing 180 Mass. 170, 62 N.E. 248 (1901); Glidden v. Harrington, 189 U.S.
255 (1903), reviewing 179 Mass. 486, 61 N.E. 54 (1901); Williams v. Parker, 188 U.S. 491
(1903), reviewing 174 Mass. 476, 55 N.E. 77 (1899).
Mr. Justice Rehnquist also summarized the status of the law in the memo:
Those federal courts of appeals that have considered the matter [of disqualification] have unanimously concluded that a federal judge has a duty to sit where
not disqualified which is equally as strong as the duty to not sit where
disqualified. [citations omitted]. These cases dealt with disqualification on the
part of judges of the district courts and of the courts of appeals. I think that
the policy in favor of the "equal duty" concept is even stronger in the case of a
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. There is no way of substituting Justices on this Court as one judge may be substituted for another in the
district courts. There is no higher court of appeal that may review an equally
divided decision of this Court and thereby establish the law for our jurisdiction.
[citations omitted]. While it can seldom be predicted with confidence at the
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Court of Appeals with an excellent opportunity to resolve the
vexing problem caused by an arbitrator's' duty to disclose information likely to create an impression of bias.3 Unfortunately,
rather than formulate a logical rubric for deciding future cases,
the court made inconsistent statements4 which will only nurture
the confusion and uncertainty that has already characterized this
issue.
The parties in Stevens filed cross-motions to enforce' and to
vacate' a unanimous,7 commercial arbitration award.' Rytex contime a Justice addresses himself to the issue of disqualification whether or not
the Court in a particular case will be closely divided, the disqualification of one
Justice of this Court raises the possibility of an affirmance of the judgment
below by an equally divided Court. The consequence attending such a result, is
of course, that the principle of law presented by the case is left unsettled. The
undesirability of such a disposition is obviously not a reason for refusing to
disqualify oneself where in fact one deems himself disqualified, but I believe it
is a reason for not "bending over backwards" in order to deem one's self disqualified.
Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 837 (1972).
On the federal level, 28 U.S.C. §47 (1970) states that: "No judge shall hear or determine an appeal from the decision of a case or issue tried by him." This statute does not
address the court of appeals judge who is elevated to the Supreme Court. See also, 28
U.S.C. §455 (1974). But see M. Schick, Learned Hand's Court 40-52 (1970) (discussion
indicating that from 1789 to 1891 a federal district court judge sitting in the circuit court
in a case on appeal could sit in review of his own decision); C. WRIGHT, HD300K OF THE
LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS §§1, 3, 97 (2d ed. 1970).
On the state level, N.Y. Judiciary Law § 14 (McKinney 1962) requires the disqualification of a judge by reasons of interest or consanguinity.
The leading law review articles on the subject, Frank, Disqualificationof Judges: In
Support of the Bayh Bill, 35 LAw AND CONTEMP. PROB. 43 (1970); and Frank,
DisqualificationofJudges, 56 YALE L.J. 605 (1947) present a comprhensive analysis of this
subject.
2. The term "arbitrator" as it is used in this casenote refers to a person who decides
a dispute based on his own discretion; this is not to be confused with an "arbiter" who is
required to adhere to the rules of law and equity.
3. The duty to disclose doctrine has been a formal requirement of arbitration since
the United States Supreme Court's landmark decision in Commonwealth Coatings Corp.
v. Continental Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968). In that case the neutral member of a
tripartite, commercial arbitration panel failed to disclose that during the previous four to
five years he had served as an engineering consultant to one of the parties and had received
$12,000 for his services. The Court vacated the award since the arbitrator's failure to
disclose these past dealings with one of the parties created an impression of possible bias
that did not satisfy the Congressional intent "to provide not merely for any arbitration
but for an impartial one." Id. at 147 (emphasis by the Court).
4. See text accompanying notes 25-36 infra.
5. N.Y. C.P.L.R. §7510 (McKinney 1963) directs that:
The court shall confirm an award upon application of a party made within one
year after its delivery to him, unless the award is vacated or modified upon a
ground specified in Section 7511.
6. N.Y. C.P.L.R. §7511(b)(1) (McKinney 1963) provides:
The award shall be vacated on the application of a party who either participated
in the arbitration or was served with a notice of intention to arbitrate if the court
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tended that two of the three arbitrators failed to disclose the
extent of their business dealings with J. P. Stevens,9 thus depriving Rytex of the opportunity to object to their serving in the
dispute. J.P. Stevens claimed that it had no substantial relationship with the arbitrators, but even if it had, the failure of Rytex
to object when it learned of the employment background of the
arbitrators prior to the hearing ' ° constituted a waiver. Stevens
stressed the fact that Rytex received an adverse award and therefore as a losing party was trying to find a means to invalidate the
award. The court accepted the contentions of Rytex and vacated
the award.
It is necessary to examine the arbitration process itself before
analyzing the court's approach to the disclosure problem so that
finds that the rights of that party were prejudiced by:
(ii) partiality of an arbitrator appointed as a neutral ....
7. The agreement between the parties contemplated an arbitration panel composed
of three neutral members. This should not be confused with the tripartite arbitration that
was provided for in Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145
(1968) which featured one representative of each party and a third neutral arbitrator. For
a discussion of the distinctions between a neutral panel and a tripartite board see Lesser,
TripartiteBoards or Single Arbitrators in Voluntary Labor Arbitration?, 5 ARi. J. 276
(1950). See generally Note, The Use of TripartiteBoards in Labor, Commercial, and
InternationalArbitration, 68 HARv. L. RPv. 293 (1955).
8. Arbitration is utilized as a dispute settlement technique for commercial impasses
and for labor-management disagreements. Although there are differences between the
commercial setting (which is influenced by the dynamics of the marketplace) and the
labor-management relationship (which is basically a permanent fixture that outlives any
one arbitration dispute) the disclosure doctrine is an outgrowth of the arbitration process
itself and is not dependent upon the type of arbitration setting to which it is applied. The
two sectors are germane to the application of the doctrine only to the extent that the
customs and usages of the respective sector affect the amount of dealings that the parties
and arbitrators are likely to have with each other and the concomitant knowledge that
the parties will have of these dealings. See generally Note, The Use of TripartiteBoards
in Labor, Commercial, and InternationalArbitration, 68 HARv. L. REV. 293 (1955).
9. Rytex challenged arbitrator Burnish who was employed by Deering Milliken, Inc.
and arbitrator Lincer who was the sales manager of Kenyon Piece Dye Works, Inc. because
of their alleged substantial business dealings with Stevens. Deering Milliken and Stevens
are large textile purchasers and Kenyon is a textile finisher and processor. The Appellate
Division concluded that the sales by Kenyon to Stevens amounted to approximately two
and one-half million dollars ($2,500,000) annually. J. P. Stevens & Co. v. Rytex Corp., 41
App. Div. 2d 15, 17, 340 N.Y.S.2d 933, 935 (1st Dep't 1973). The Court of Appeals based
its determination to vacate the award on this relationship between Lincer, his employer
Kenyon, and Stevens.
10. The American Arbitration Association [hereinafter AAA] informed the parties
of the employment status of the arbitrators and in accordance with the rules of the AAA
directed that "if either party has any factual objections to the above appointments, it is
requested that said objections be filed in writing. .. ." J. P. Stevens & Co. v. Rytex
Corp., 34 N.Y.2d 123, 126, 312 N.E.2d 466, 467, 356 N.Y.S.2d 278, 280 (1974).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1975

3

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [1975], Art. 7

Hofstra Law Review

[Vol. 3, 1975]

disclosure can be viewed in its proper context, namely, as a part
of the overall arbitration process.
The heart of the process of arbitration is neutrality. In routine conversation the arbitrator is often referred to as the "neutral" or the "impartial". This concept has been explained accurately by Professor Frank Elkouri: 11
No qualification is more important than that of impartiality. It may well be that no man can be absolutely free from bias
or prejudice of any kind, but it is not too much to expect an
arbitrator to be able to divest himself of any personal inclinations, and to be able to stand between the parties with an open
mind. This does not mean, however, that an arbitrator should
decide contrary to his own best judgment. Indeed, the element
of honesty is not satisfied unless the arbitrator fully believes
that he is doing what is right. To be an arbitrator worthy of the
name, one must always be able and ready to "call 'em as he sees
'em". As long as both parties believe that an arbitrator is doing
that, they will respect him whether or not they "see 'em" the
same way he does.
Therefore, in arbitration there is a recognition that an arbitrator
may have some preconceived notions. When an arbitrator enters
a dispute, however, he must have a so-called "open mind" and
be amenable to changing his thinking after hearing a persuasive
argument. The fact that an arbitrator has developed certain notions about the practices of a given industry is actually somewhat
advantageous, for that knowledge enables him to better decide
how a controversy should be resolved."2
In order for a person to be selected to serve as an arbitrator,
it is necessary for him to be acceptable to the parties involved in
the dispute.13 Acceptability can be divided into two categories:
11. F. ELKOURI, How ARBrrRATION WORKS 54 (1952).
12. See generally Firemen's Fund Ins. Co. v. Flint Hosiery Mills Inc., 74 F.2d 533,
535 (4th Cir. 1935) (appraiser's previous dealings with insurance companies furnished the
requisite skills); Atlantic Rayon Corp. v. Goldsmith, 277 App. Div. 554, 100 N.Y.S. 2d 849
(1st Dep't 1950) (prior business dealings with a party were not a basis for disqualification
where selection was under the bailiwick of a trade association and the arbitrator had
special skill and experience); Newburger v. Rose, 228 App. Div. 526, 240 N.Y.S. 436 (1st
Dep't 1930) (stockbroker was warranted to arbitrate a dispute involving preferred stock).
13. For a discussion concerning the problems engendered by the need for arbitrators
to be acceptable, see Hill, The PresidentialAddress: The Academy and the Expanding
Role of Neutrals, in ARBrrRATION AND THE EXPANDING RoLE OF NEUTRALS 187 (G. Somers
ed. 1970); Coulson, Labor Aribtration:The Insecure Profession?, 18 LAB. L.J. 336 (1967);
Appendix D. Report of the Committee on Research and Education:Education and Training of Arbitrators,in THE PROFESSION OF LABoR AiBrBMATION 171 (J. McKelvey ed. 1957).
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technical competence and visibility. Technical competence consists of the requisite working knowledge of a field which enables
a person to be intellectually qualified to resolve a dispute arising
in that area. Visibility, which cannot be achieved until a person
has obtained the technical competence, is gained when the existence of this expertise is communicated to the people who do the
selecting, i.e., attorneys, management officials, and union officers. 4 Achieving visibility and the resultant acceptability is a
major obstacle for the would-be arbitrator, as he must try to
establish personal contacts with the selectors yet at the same
time avoid creating circumstances that cause conflicts of interest.
While the need for acceptability is a legitimate prerequisite for
selection, the inherent danger that conflicts of interest will develop must be controlled. The need to eliminate conflicts of interest has resulted in statutory requirements' 5 which have been supplemented by a professional code of ethics'6 and the formal rules
of the American Arbitration Association," the major clearing
house for arbitrators.' s
14. The reader is referred to Professor Herbert Sherman's articles on the duty to
disclose, which provide an analysis of the opinions of arbitrators, union officials and
company representatives from different geographic areas in the United States. Each respondent was presented with situations an arbitrator might confront concerning disclosure
and was asked whether the arbitrator should disclose the information to the parties. The
results of the survey indicated that there was general accord on what information should
be disclosed, however, there was not unanimity. As a result an arbitrator may be quite
perplexed about disclosing a specific point. Sherman, Arbitrator'sDuty of Disclosure-A
Sequel, 32 U. Prrr L. REV. 167 (1971); Sherman, Labor Arbitrator'sDuty of Disclosure,
31 U. Prrr. L. REv. 377 (1970), reprintedas The Duty of Disclosurein Labor Arbitration,
25 ARm. J. 73 (1970).
15. See 9 U.S.C. §10; notes 5 & 6 supra.
16. AMERICAN ARBrIRATION ASSOCIATION CODE OF ETIcs AND PROCEDURAL STANDARDS
FOR LABOR-MANAGEMENT ARBITRATION (1951).
The arbitrator should not undertake or incur obligations to either party which
may interfere with his impartial determination of the issue submitted to him.
Id. at pt. I §4.
17. AMmicAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, VOLUNTARY LABOR ARBITRATzON RULES (1970).
No person shall serve as a neutral Arbitrator in any arbitration in which he has
any financial or personal interest in the result of the arbitration, unless the
parties, in writing, waive such disqualification.
Id. at Rule 11.
Prior to accepting his appointment, the prospective neutral Arbitrator shall
disclose any circumstances likely to create a presumption of bias or which he
believes might disqualify him as an impartial Arbitrator. Upon receipt of such
information, the AAA shall immediately disclose it to the parties. If either
party declines to waive the presumptive disqualification, the vacancy thus created shall be filled in accordance with the applicable provisions of these Rules.
Id, at Rule 17.
18. The AAA has at times failed to take proper administrative steps to satisfy the
due process requirements of the arbitration process. See Rogers v. Schering Corp., 165 F.
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An effect of the need for acceptability that is implicit in the
voluntary nature of arbitration is that it has been extremely difficult for a young, inexperienced arbitrator to enter the profession.'"
Parties to a dispute like to be able to view an arbitrator's track
record before making a selection. Once chosen, the parties feel
that knowing the arbitrator's background helps them plan their
strategy for the hearing. As a result parties feel less secure when
an arbitrator is inexperienced. 0
Being inexperienced is an even greater handicap under the
disclosure doctrine, which places a particular burden on unseasoned arbitrators who are struggling to convince the parties that
they are in fact acceptable. Their disclosures will be scrutinized
all the more closely because of the parties' underlying uneasiness
with the arbitrator's inexperience. Because, as will be developed
later,2' the present standard for disclosure is confusing and unworkable, the inexperienced arbitrator who has not developed a
so-called "feel" for what to disclose, faces the possibility of overdisclosing information and raising sufficient doubts in the minds
of the parties necessitating disqualification,22 or of underdisclosing information and causing post-hearing litigation to vacate the
award.?
Supp. 295 (D.N.J. 1958); Bear & Beards, Inc. v. Oleg Cassini, Inc., 37 App. Div. 2d 106,
322 N.Y.S.2d 462 (lst Dep't 1971); Milliken Woolens, Inc. v. Weber Knit Sportswear, Inc.,
11 App. Div. 2d 166, 202 N.Y.S.2d 431 (1st Dep't 1960).
19. Compare McDermott, Progress Report: ProgramsDirected at the Development

of New Arbitrators, in ARBITIATION OF INTEREST DIsPUTEs 247-48 (B. Dennis & G. Somers
eds. 1974) (where in 1971 only 7.2% of the arbitrators rendering written opinions in AAA
cases were under age 40), with Coulson, Labor Arbitration:The Insecure Profession?, 18

LAB. L.J. 336, 342 (1967) (where in 1964 only 5.1% were less than 40 years of age).
An additional point is suggested by the age distribution of arbitrators: is there inherent discrimination in the arbitration process because of the high age of arbitrators? For
example, if an average labor arbitrator is 57, Appendix C. Survey of the Arbitration
Professionin 1969, in ARBITRATION AND THE PUmc INTEREST 275 (G. Somers & B. Dennis

eds. 1971) is there an underlying philosophical orientation to issues concerning drugs, long
hair, and improper dress? Similarly, is it not possible that in the absence of more than a
handful of women arbitrators, see, e.g., CCH Labor Arbitration Awards 9601-757 (1974),
issues particularly related to women are not receiving proper treatment? See McKelvey,

The PresidentialAddress: Sex and the Single Arbitrator,in ARBITRATION AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST 1 (G. Somers & B. Dennis eds. 1971).
20. See generally Herzog, Livingston, Seward & Simkin, The Development of Qualified New Arbitrators,in CoLLEcrIvE BARGAINING AND THE ARBIRATOr's RoLE 205 (M. Kahn
ed. 1962); Coulson, supra note 13; McDermott, The Development of New Arbitrators,in
ARBITRATION AND THE PUBuc INTEREST 308 (G. Somers & B. Dennis eds. 1971).
21. See notes 25-37 infra and accompanying text.

22. This problem of overdisclosing information was recognized by Mr. Justice White
who stated that:
In many cases the arbitrator might believe the business relationship to be so
insubstantial that to make a point of revealing it would suggest he is indeed
easily swayed, and perhaps a partisan of that party.
Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 151 (1968).

23. See, e.g., Shirley Silk Co. v. American Silk Mills, Inc., 260 App. Div. 572, 23
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The need for acceptability and the concomitant burden that
inexperienced arbitrators face are important aspects of the disclosure cases. It is unfortunate that courts have not thoroughly examined these extra-legal aspects of the disclosure problem, because this insensitivity to the arbitration process precludes them
from dealing properly with the issue.2 4 This is not to say that the
disclosure requirement should be eliminated. However, the actual burdens caused by disclosure must be recognized, rather
than glossed over, as was done by the Stevens' court, in order to
construct a realistic framework for dealing with the problem.
Therefore, it is essential to examine the treatment by the Stevens'
court of first, the standard for arbitrators to use in determining
what to disclose, and second, when this standard is followed,
where the actual burden of disclosure rests.
The first issue which the Court of Appeals addressed concerned the standard of disclosure that should be used to judge
whether the arbitrator acted properly. After determining that a
substantial relationship existed between Stevens and the two
the arbitrators
challenged arbitrators, the court indicated that
"
should have disclosed their dealings because: 2
it could reasonably be inferred that a person in his [the arbitra-

tor's] position might not have been acceptable as an arbitrator
if the facts had been disclosed to Rytex. (emphasis added).
The use of the expression "could reasonably be inferred" should
be noted because, while it passes under the guise of presenting a
standard for resolving the controversy, in practical terms it conveys little guidance.
The court then cited Rule 17 of the AAA to support its discloN.Y.S. 2d 254 (1st Dep't 1940); Knickerbocker Textile Corp. v. Sheild-Lynn, Inc., 172
Misc. 1015, 16 N.Y.S.2d 435 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1939).
It may also be argued that to the extent that there are not prescribed standards of
behavior to guide neutrals, the advance notice element of due process is not satisfied. This
is particularly ironic since the disclosure doctrine is designed to assure due process.
24. This insensitivity leads to inaccurate statements, such as the following one by Mr.
Justice Black:
We can perceive no way in which the effectiveness of the arbitration process will
be hampered by the simple requirement that arbitrators disclose to the parties
any dealings that might create an impression of possible bias.
Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). This
statement reveals that the Supreme Court did not grasp the actual burden that disclosure
presents to inexperienced arbitrators.
25. J. P. Stevens & Co. v. Rytex Corp., 34 N.Y.2d 123, 126-27, 312 N.E.2d 466, 468,
356 N.Y.S. 2d 278, 280 (1974).
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sure position. 2' However, this rule requires an arbitrator to.disclose "any circumstances likely to create a presumption of
bias." 2 The court's reasoning and holding are contradictory because two different standards-inference and presumption-were
employed in deciding the case. 28 If the court intends that arbitrators disclose information that may cause an inference of bias,
then disclosure will be broad because an inference is easily created. However, if the court's goal is for arbitrators to disclose
information that raises a presumption of bias, disclosure will be
more limited, since a strong interest on the part of the arbitrator
would have to be shown. The net effect of the court's vacillation
between these terms is confusion. As a result, there is no precise
or logical standard to guide arbitrators and judges in future decisions. For the inexperienced arbitrator, the lack of a clear guide29
line will be particularly burdensome.
Furthermore, in attempting to identify the precise standard
that an arbitrator should follow when determining what information to disclose, the majority stated that:"
the very nature of the arbitrator's quasi-judicial function, particularly since it is subject to only limited judicial review, demands no less a duty to disclose than would be expected of a
Judge.
This analogy does not make sense.3 ' The fact that most persons
only serve as arbitrators on an ad hoc basis necessitates that they
continue to deal in the marketplace setting. Thus, it is impractical to expect them to subscribe to the same stringent standards
26. Id. at 128, 312 N.E.2d at 468-69, 356 N.Y.S. 2d at 282.
27. American Arbitration Association, Voluntary Labor Arbitration Rules at Rule 17
(1970) (emphasis added).
28. See J. P. Stevens & Co. v. Rytex Corp., 34 N.Y.2d 123, 125, 312 N.E.2d 466, 467,
356 N.Y.S.2d 278, 279 (1974) where the court states:
We agree and hold that the failure of an arbitrator to disclose facts which
reasonably may support an inference of bias is grounds to vacate the
award ....

(emphasis added).

But see id. at 129-30, 312 N.E.2d at 469, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 283, where the court proclaims:
[W]e do hold that in the interest of fairness (and to avoid just such a litigation
as we deal with here) all arbitrators before entering upon their duties should
make known any relationship direct or indirect that they have with any party
to the arbitration, and disclose all facts known to them which might indicatt
any interest or create a presumption of bias (emphasis added).
29. See notes 20-23 supra and accompanying text.
30. J. P. Stevens & Co. v. Rytex Corp., 34 N.Y.2d 123, 129, 312 N.E.2d 466, 469, 356
N.Y.S. 2d 278, 282 (1974).
31. See Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 150
(1968) (White, J., concurring) (criticizing majority's analogy of arbitrator to judge).
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that are expected of judges32 who are required to maintain a sense
of distance from the business world because of the nature of their
33
function .
After the court disposed of the disclosure standard problem,
it next considered where the burden of disclosure should be
placed. The court stated that the primary burden for disclosure
rests on the arbitrator, "[who] is in a far better position than the
parties to determine and reveal those facts that might give rise
to an inference of bias."" The court recognized that the arbitrator's position in respect to the parties and the process necessitates
that he make the ultimate decision concerning what to disclose,
since only the arbitrator knows his own background, which may
be quite varied, and of any indirect contacts he may have had
with the parties.3 5 However, the court carved out an exception to
this principle by allowing the arbitrator to escape responsibility
even if he does not disclose relevant information: 3 6
If a party goes forward with arbitration, having actual knowledge of the arbitrator's bias, or facts that reasonably should
have prompted further, limited inquiry, it may not later claim
bias based upon the failure to disclose such facts.
This provision absolves an arbitrator from the general disclosure
requirement if a party knew or should have known of a fact normally requiring disclosure and, nevertheless, failed to object to
the arbitrator on the basis of the information. While this passage
is intended to prohibit a losing party from using these grounds as
a pretext to vacate an adverse award,37 logically it makes little
32. See generally Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (judge not permitted to receive
compensation from fines paid by those people who were convicted by him); Johnson v.
Johnson, 424 P.2d 414 (Okla. 1967) (provisions made for litigants to prove their due
process rights had been prejudiced by judge who had received bribes from 1934-39).
33. See 22 N.Y.C.R.R. 33.4-33.7 (1974)(limitations placed on nonjudicial activities of
judges).
34. J. P. Stevens & Co. v. Rytex Corp., 34 N.Y.2d 123, 129, 312 N.E.2d 466, 469, 356
N.Y.S.2d 278, 283 (1974).
35. The Stevens' court felt that the impact of this full disclosure would be the elimination of a great deal of post-hearing litigation, for the parties would have all of the
information germane to the partiality issue in advance of the arbitration proceeding and
therefore would have no reason to litigate subsequently. Id. at 128, 312 N.E.2d at 469, 356
N.Y.S.2d at 282 (1974).
36. Id.
37. Over the years courts have indicated their displeasure with parties who move to
vacate arbitration awards as a delaying tactic or as a last-ditch effort to escape the
provisions of the award. See Firemen's Fund Ins. Co. v. Flint Hosiery Mills, Inc., 74 F.2d
533 (4th Cir. 1935) (court held against the party who had unclean hands and had lost the
arbitration); Cross Properties, Inc. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 15 App. Div. 2d 913, 225 N.Y.S.
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sense. Either an arbitrator is required to disclose something or he
is not, but the propriety of such a disclosure should not depend
upon the actions of a party to the arbitration." If courts instead
followed a fixed approach of uniformly placing the burden on the
arbitrator, then the arbitrator would be on notice that he must
disclose properly or else face the embarrassing situation of having
his award vacated.
The court has blurred these two issues-the disclosure standard and the burden of disclosure-to a point where a careful
inspection of the opinion can only leave the reader perplexed. It
is therefore necessary to construct a model to deal effectively with
the disclosure problem. The doctrine of "informed consent"
seems to be the answer because it provides a direct focus on what
the standard of disclosure should be and directs where the burden
should lie. It adopts the inference standard, one of the two standards discussed by the Court of Appeals, and proceeds to unequivocally place the burden for disclosure on the arbitrator. It is
easier to understand the application of the informed consent doctrine to the arbitrator's duty to disclose when one analogizes the
use of informed consent to the doctor-patient and the
manufacturer-consumer relationships.
In past years a doctor knew his patients and their families
well. He therefore had a confidential relationship with them and
could make medical judgments for them with complete knowledge of their needs and feelings. When a legal challenge concerning authorization for an operation or medical approach arose, the
courts directed their attention to whether the physician exercised
the accepted professional standard of care. 9 The fact that the
medical profession has, in recent years, been composed of specialists who are not usually well acquainted with their patients, has
forced the courts to reevaluate the professional standard of disclosure in the community approach and consider the more fundamental question of whether a physician has obtained consent
2d 1014 (lst Dep't. 1962) (arbitrator's business dealings with a party were known to the
party moving to vacate the award and therefore objection to them was deemed waived);
Atlantic Rayon Corp. v. Goldsmith, 277 App. Div. 554, 556, 100 N.Y.S.2d 849, 850 (1st
Dep't 1950) (court indicated it was loathe to sustain belated claims of disqualification).
38. The distinction between requiring disclosure and disqualification should be
stressed at this point. Clearly, a party may waive disqualification of an arbitrator if the
relevant fact has been disclosed. However, the issue here involves whether the party may
waive the disclosure itself.
39. Note, Restructuring Informed Consent: Legal Therapy for the Doctor-Patient
Relationship, 79 YALE L.J. 1533, 1556 & n.66 (1970).
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from a patient to perform the challenged operation or other act."
The key requirement of the consent doctrine is that the doctor has
a duty to tell his patient everything he needs to know in order to

decide whether he wants to permit the doctor to proceed." If the
doctor fails to inform his patient of relevant information, thereby

improperly securing consent, he may subsequently be liable for
2

malpractice.
The sufficiency of the warning on pharmaceutical products
creates a similar problem in the area of products liability. Although the actual danger level of the product remains constant
with or without a warning by the manufacturer, the consumer
must be given an opportunity to decide whether to expose himself

to that risk of danger." *
Professor Aaron Twerski has stated:4 4
The issue is not that of unreasonable product danger, but rather
one of informed consent. The defendant manufacturer of the
product had a duty to inform potential plaintiffs that certain
risks are inherent in the drugs. If the plaintiffs consent to take
the drug is based on inadequate knowledge, then his consent to
a battery was fraudulently obtained. Whether or not there has
been sufficient communication of information to the plaintiff
depends on the scope of informed consent law. Clearly, the defendant need not inform the plaintiff of all risks.
The framework for analyzing disclosure in the arbitration
process should similarly be based on informed consent. A party
who permits an outsider to resolve an internal dispute is exercis-

ing the same type of trust that a patient does when he permits a
doctor to operate or that a consumer does when he relies on a
40. See id. Compare Mitchell v. Robinson, 334 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1960), with Aiken v.
Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668, 674 (Mo. 1965) (overruling Mitchell on issue of how to satisfy
burden of proof in informed consent).
41. The decision about what is or is not relevant information upon which a
patient can base an informed consent is a human judgment, not a determination
requiring medical expertise. When the doctor makes this decision, he does not
deserve the special protection afforded his professional activities by the professional standard of negligence. His lack of a sustained personal relationship with
his patients deprives the professional of any special ability to perceive a reasonable patient's capacity or need to understand and evaluate a proposed intervention. The doctor should be judged as an ordinary reasonable man (footnotes
omitted).
Note, supra note 39, at 1559.
42. For a discussion of the provision for a therapeutic priviledge to withhold information in emergencies, see id. at 1564-71.
43. Twerski, Assumption of Risk, 60 IOWA L. Rav. 1, 46 (1974).
44. Id. at 46-47.
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manufacturer for pharmaceutical products. Although extreme
physical danger is not involved in arbitration, the seriousness of
the issues that require arbitration, as well as the limited scope of
judicial review of arbitration awards create grave concerns which
make the informed consent analogy accurate.45 Since arbitration
is voluntary, the parties must be informed of all facts pertinent
to the ability of the arbitrator to serve impartially. The focus is
therefore on what the parties need to know. In the absence of
proper disclosure, the parties have not given their informed consent and therefore any award must be vacated.
There remains the problem of the actual standard that
should be applied. The informed consent approach provides
courts, arbitrators, and parties with a logical structure to guide
them. All that need be asked is, what would a reasonable party
want to know in order to exercise an informed consent? The burden is still on the arbitrator, but the informed consent doctrine
reduces this burden by providing a rational, workable formula
that pinpoints the purpose of disclosure. The arbitrator no longer
needs to divert his attention to distinguishing between an inference and a presumption; rather, he can concentrate on disclosing
the information that a reasonable party would need in order to
give an informed consent. Admittedly, the actual definition of
"reasonable" will have to be supplied through judicial interpretation." Although the situation may occasionally develop in which
a party knows of an interest by an arbitrator, fails to object, and
then subsequently uses that interest as a pretext for invalidating
an award, this problem should not be used to detract from the
important advantages that the informed consent doctrine provides, namely, a workable standard for disclosure and a specific
allocation of the burden on the arbitrator.
45. See United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960);
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). But see Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
46. There may be a need to provide for the situation where an arbitrator is honestly
unaware of a fact subject to disclosure. For example, an arbitrator could have dealings
with a company controlled by the same conglomerate that owned some of the parties. If
the party with "due diligence" could have brought the information to the arbitrator's
attention, then it should be the duty of that party to do so. The standard to be applied to
this test is enunciated by Judge Wachtler in the dissent to J. P. Stevens & Co. v. Rytex
Corp., 34 N.Y.2d 123, 131, 312 N.E.2d 466, 470, 356 N.Y.S. 2d 278, 284 (1974)(dissenting
opinion). For an appropriate case where the "due diligence" approach could have been
applied see Brewery Workers v. P. Ballantine & Sons, Inc., 83 L.R.R.M. 2712 (D.N.J.
1973) (where arbitrator's cousin's financial dealings with the victorious party were not
known to the arbitrator).
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A secondary problem which this doctrine will not resolve is
the volume of litigation. Although frivilous appeals are frowned
upon 7 and do in fact contribute to court congestion, the advantage to a party knowing he has been afforded due process of law
provides a justification for whatever impediments such a system
creates. By utilizing a sound, direct doctrine such as informed
consent, once the standard for disclosure is firmly established by
the courts, frivolous claims of partiality will become easily identifiable.
Application of this approach can be seen by returning now
to the principle case of J. P. Stevens & Co. v. Rytex Corp. The
proper question to raise is whether a reasonable party would want
to know the extent of the business dealings between the arbitrator
and J. P. Stevens.18 Since the relationship was substantial, a
party would want to have this information in order to make an
informed decision. It should be noted that in the instant case the
same result would be reached, i.e., vacatur. However, it is hoped
that had the arbitrator in this case had the informed consent
doctrine on which to rely, such an oversight, necessitating vacatur, would never have occurred.
The informed consent doctrine, were it adopted, should
prove to be a workable method for alleviating the problems that
arbitrators, parties, and courts have had in dealing with the questions of the standard of disclosure and the burden of disclosure,
while still accomplishing the desired equitable result. Informed
consent provides a simple, logical procedure. If the courts and the
arbitration profession gear their requirements accordingly, arbitration will function more efficiently.
Robert L. Douglas
47. See note 35 supra.
48. See note 9 supra.
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